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 “The Portuguese nation is, essentially, cosmopolitan. 
Never has a true Portuguese been Portuguese:  
He has always been everything” 
 
 





In a globalised world like today, new challenges are imposed on national 
companies and products. Internationalisation emerges as an imperative for the 
survival of organizations. 
There is rich literature in the field of the cross-border acquisitions. However, it is 
focused on its pre- and post-acquisition process, taking a financial, accounting 
and human resource’s perspectives. There is a gap in the study of cross-border 
acquisitions in an international business perspective. 
Therefore, this multiple case study research will analyse the effect of cross-border 
acquisitions in the firm internationalisation of two Portuguese multinational 
firms, which have several years of existence. 
In this way, the aim of this study is to realise how did these companies grew in 
the international arena through cycles of cross-border acquisitions, their 
organisational background, strategies adopted to the expansion of the brand and 
product to foreign markets and what was the role of the business networks. 
In the end, it is possible to understand the effect of cross-border acquisitions in 
their internationalisation process and how did they strengthened their positions 
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Globalisation has been rising at a fast pace since the 1980s, making the world look 
smaller and the domestic market competition increase, due to the forces of 
international competition (Cavusgil & Knight, 2015). It has been affecting trade, 
since companies began to internationalise their production, distribution and 
marketing, and the flows of capital and investment substantially increased (Hnát, 
2008). With the domestic market losing importance, the focus and strategy of 
companies began to be the global market, betting on exports and in the pursuit 
of investment opportunities. 
Overall, IB scholars agree that internationalisation is the process by which firms 
expand their business activities beyond the borders of their own countries. 
There are several ways that a firm can internationalise its activities, entering a 
foreign market, but this study will focus on cross-border acquisitions.  
According to Shimizu et al. (2004), cross-border acquisitions are those involving 
“an acquirer firm and a target firm whose headquarters are located in different countries”. 
They are an important corporate strategy for companies that desire to extend 
their business to new markets, stretch their capabilities and diversify into related 
markets (Wang & Xie, 2009). 
Cross-border acquisitions shaped the world as we know it today. Scholars 
identified six waves of M&As, which do not have a conclusive theory yet. 
However, they have been caused by combination of economic, regulatory and 
technological changes, driving companies to consider M&A to preserve their 
competitive position in the market (Cordeiro, 2014). 
According to Andrade & Stafford (2004), the driver behind the fifth wave was 
industry expansion (growth), resulting in increased globalisation and cross-
border acquisitions. 
In this way, it was during the fifth wave (DePhamphlis, 2001), started in the early 
1990s, that cross-border acquisitions took the leading choice of companies’ entry 
mode in foreign markets. It was considered the fastest way of organic growth, 
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but it was soon discovered that cross-border acquisitions also bring countless 
challenges and obstacles to overcome.  
Until now, the main debate among experts was from a financial perspective, 
concerning with the acquisition performance, or from a human resource’s 
perspective, concerning with the integration of the acquired company and the 
possible organisational cultural clashes. 
 
This research will be centred on answering to the question: “How will cross-border 
acquisitions influence a firm’s internationalisation process?” 
 
For this purpose, this dissertation is structured in four parts. In a first part – 
Literature Review –, it will be exposed and reviewed the existing literature in the 
research field of this dissertation, referring to key concepts, theories and models. 
The topics related to the object of study include a firm’s internationalisation 
process and cross-border acquisitions to generate a more focused view on the 
research question. 
A second part – Research Methods –, in which it provides the ethical conduct 
followed by the author and describes and justifies the chosen methodology to 
conduct the study, presenting the data collection methods and the techniques to 
analyse it.  
A third part – The case studies –, that presents the empirical results obtained from 
the interviews, which are interpreted and analysed. Furthermore, the companies 
are described, as well as their internationalisation and cross-border acquisition 
processes, analysing the pre- and post-acquisition phases separately.  
A fourth part – Discussion –, that supported by the previous chapter will 
compare the results of the case studies with the existing literature findings. The 
aim of this chapter is to realise if there are any findings that are not present in the 
existing literature already. 
Finally, the fifth part – Conclusions and Limitations –, that presents the key 
findings and conclusions of this research, some study limitations and possible 
future research questions. 
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CHAPTER 1:  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. FIRM INTERNATIONALISATION 
1.1.  THE INTERNATIONALISATION PROCESS  
It is agreed among international business researchers that firms’ 
internationalisation is a process in which firms gradually increase their 
international involvement (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, p.23). For Beamish (1990, 
p.77) internationalisation is "the process by which firms both increase their awareness 
of the direct and indirect influence of international transactions on their future, and 
establish and conduct transactions with other countries”. More recently, Mathews 
(2006) argued that internationalisation “is the multiple connections of the global 
economy which draw firms into involvement across national borders, through 
contracting, licensing or other transaction relationships”. Overall, IB researchers 
agree that the internationalisation is the process by which companies expand 
their businesses beyond the borders of their own countries. 
In the 1950s, 60s and 70s, the exports grew much stronger than FDI. However, 
since the 1980s, this has changed, where 16.3% FDI growth substantially 
exceeded the 6.2% export growth per year (Hillebrandt & Welfens, 1998). FDI plays 
a pivotal role on MNEs and on their involvement on the international activities. 
“We define MNEs as companies which undertake productive activities outside the 
country in which they are incorporated” (Dunning, 1977, p.400). 
In fact, in the contemporary world, businesses may start their operations 
domestically, but already outlining a long-term strategy to go international. 
Internationalisation changed drastically the landscape for most businesses and 
raised fierce competition for the companies. 
Many businesses were driven to become more globally integrated primarily due 
to external forces. However, firms less affected by globalisation restructured their 
businesses, since they recognised that by doing so, they could gain significant 
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competitive advantage compared to foreign ones, pursuing profits in the global 
market (Ethier, 1986). 
To exploit opportunities beyond their national borders, local companies started 
to standardise their products, being more than locally responsive. While the 
traditional multinational companies managed their subsidiaries as unique and 
independent from the others, in the 1980s and 90s, the major problem was the 
coordination and configuration of the subsidiaries, as MNEs entered new 
markets (Gong, 2013).  
1 . 1 . 1 .  W h y  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s e ?  
The Eclectic Paradigm began to be a framework to explain the companies’ FDI 
decisions (Dunning, 1988), but later the author added the possible motives for 
that decisions. Companies have different raison d’être for their FDI decisions. 
Dunning (2000) identified different motivations for companies to internationalise 
their primarily productive activities.  
The earliest motivation was resource seeking, driving companies to invest 
abroad; it represents the companies’ need to secure resources that were not 
available in home-country or were cheaper in foreign countries, guaranteeing the 
stability of supply and to access low-cost factors of production. By 1850, many 
companies had already crossed the Atlantic, looking for new markets, arising the 
market seeking motivation; it is typical in companies that have some intrinsic 
advantage, which gave them competitive advantage in offshore markets. 
Efficiency seeking, where companies’ FDI decisions are designed to promote a 
more efficient division of labour, rationalising production and better distribute 
the structure of the MNE; and, finally, strategic asset seeking, that arises from the 
foreign investors seeking distinctive and specific knowledge, administrative or 
reputational resources available overseas. These intangible assets may only be 
acquired through joint-ventures, international takeovers, etc.  
Later, other IB scholars (Bartlett, Ghoshal & Birkinshaw, 2004) divided the 
motivations for internationalisation in traditional and emerging motivations: 
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Competitive Positioning: presence in key-markets where competitors operate. It 
can be a strategy to anticipate the presence in markets that will interest 
competitors or an attempt to ‘play the global chess’, increasing competitive 
pressure on competitors. 
Strategic asset seeking was replaced by: 
Global scanning and learning: it is a motivation that arises by the need of 
augment or protect specific advantages of a company, that do not exist in home-
country. Often associated with long-term strategies, companies can act through 
the acquisition of firms holding the strategic assets; acquisition of expertise in 




Figure 1 – Internationalisation Motives 
Source: Adapted from Dunning (2000) 
1 . 1 . 2 .  W h e r e  w i l l  t h e  c o m p a n y  g o ?  
1 . 1 . 2 . 1 .  U p p s a l a  M o d e l   
Many IB researchers agree that companies’ internationalisation is a gradual 
process of international involvement. The best-known model was developed by 
two Swedish academics, who described foreign market entry as a learning 
process. The Uppsala Model defends that internationalisation is a gradual 
process, that starts with a small investment to get market knowledge; and just 
after several cycles of investment, the company develops the necessary levels of 
local capability and market knowledge to be an effective competitor in the 
foreign country (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, p.23). 
In this way, the U-model is adopted by small companies with little or no 
international experience and knowledge about the markets, that seek, 
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Figure 2 – Original Uppsala Model 
Source: Johanson & Vahlne (1977) 
 
Attached to this model is the concept of psychic distance, which appeared for the 
first time in 1912, applied to the arts (Bullough, 1912). However, more than a 
century later, this concept is transverse to other fields, being IB one of them.  
Nordstrom and Vahlne (1992) described psychic distance as “factors preventing or 
disturbing the flow of information between potential or actual suppliers and customers” 
– whose factors were grouped into four areas, such as linguistic differences and 
translation difficulties, cultural factors, economic situation and political and legal 
systems. 
Although the concept was already fully formed, it was the study of Johanson and 
Vahlne (1977) and the U-model that gave psychic distance the pivotal role in the 
internationalisation process of firms. The studies of these researchers suggested 
that companies would internationalise to psychologically proximate countries – 
with some firm-specific advantage in the foreign market (liability of foreignness) 
– and further international expansion would be gradually done to countries with 
greater psychological distance. In other words, it says that the difficulty and cost 
of obtaining information about foreign markets is proportional to the psychic 




1 . 1 . 3 .  H o w  w i l l  t h e  c o m p a n y  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s e ?  
1 . 1 . 3 . 1 .  M o d e s  o f  e n t r y   
Following a gradual rhythm of internationalisation, Johanson and Vahlne (1976; 
1977) distinguished the steps a company should take to commit to a particular 
market – the establishment chain: 
 Sporadic exports 
 Exports through a sales representative 
 Licensing and franchise agreements 
 Joint-ventures with local partners 
 Exports through sales subsidiaries 
 Wholly-owned subsidiaries 
 
 
Figure 3 – Establishment chain 
Source: Johanson & Vahlne (1977) 
 
Later studies from these researchers (Johanson & Vahlne, 1990) placed the 
hypotheses of skipping some steps if: 
 The firms have access to a large pool of resources; 
 The market conditions are stable and homogeneous, and relevant 
knowledge can be acquired without direct experience; 





1 . 1 . 4 .  L i m i t a t i o n s  o f  U - M o d e l  
The U-Model had greatly contributed to the IB literature, broadening the 
understanding of the internationalisation process; however, it has some 
limitations, since it does not consider the drastic changes that business 
environment suffered in these last decades.  
Globalisation changed completely the businesses environment, creating both 
opportunities and challenges in the field of international businesses, and the 
rapid technology development allowed companies to respond faster and better 
to the markets than before. In this way, the U-model shows a handicap, being 
incapable of describing the internationalisation process of the modern 
businesses. 
Moreover, it is a model that analyses individual companies and not companies 
as actors in their business networks (Madsen et al., 1997). The changes should be 
understood in an inter-organisational context, considering the networks across 
borders, since there are differences between countries and products’ 
international extension, coordination and integration. 
1.2.  BUSINESS NETWORKS  
‘‘Industrial markets are characterised by stability instead of change, long-lasting 
relationships instead of short business transactions and closeness instead of distance’’ 
(Håkansson, 1982, p.6). 
In this way, many scholars describe the industrial markets as networks of 
relationships between companies (Johanson & Mattsson, 1988). 
Later, ‘network’ is defined as the set of interrelated relationships between 
companies (Håkansson & Johanson, 1992, 1993). The constituent elements of the 
network are the actors, the activities and the resources, which are related among 
them throughout the network structure (Håkansson, 1982). Therefore, there are 
exchanges of resources between the actors and activities within a business 
network. Sharma (1993) states that the network includes the exchange of 
resources between its different members (suppliers, customers, competitors, 
distributors, etc.), allowing companies to use the network to develop 
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relationships that allow access to resources and sell their products and services 
(Johanson & Mattsson, 1988). 
1 . 2 . 1 .  I n t e r n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  B N s  
BNs draw attention for the companies’ internationalisation process as a result 
from its position and relationships. The existing relations within the network 
work as bridges to external markets and allow the identification and exploration 
of business opportunities, motivating the internalisation of companies (Johanson 
& Vahlne, 2009). For instance, a company positioned within a foreign network 
will be in contact with foreign actors. 
There are four ways that a business network can internationalise, according to 
Johanson and Mattsson (1986, 1988). 
 
 
Figure 4 – Internationalisation of Business Networks 
Source: Johanson & Mattsson (1986,1988) 
 
1. The Early Starter: companies have little or no international experience in a 
little internationalised market. At this stage, companies have weak ties with 
foreign networks, since there is a lack of experiential knowledge in the 
market. The size of the company and the scale and scope of its operations 
will determine the mode of entry into the foreign market. Always aware that 
the knowledge of other actors within the network influences the decision-
making of the company, it can enter the market from the initiative of a local 
distributor (market penetration strategy).  
2. The Late Starter: like before, the late starter has a low degree of 
internationalisation, however, it is positioned in a highly-internationalised 
market. In this way, the firm has little or no experience in international 
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markets and few direct international relationships. However, it would be in 
a more advantageous position in relation to the early starter, since it resides 
in a more internationalised network, enjoying its experiential knowledge and 
the possibility of cultivating stronger relationships (extension strategy). 
3. The Lonely International: although actors are positioned in an 
internationally inexperienced network, they are more committed to the 
internationalisation process, increasing the level of experience knowledge, 
when compared to the previous ones. Being pioneers in markets that have 
little or no external competition, companies obtain their experiential 
knowledge in first-hand. However, at this stage, international knowledge to 
manage and coordinate the operations and relationships was not yet 
acquired. Usually results in entry modes in the area of investment (market 
penetration strategy).  
4. The International Among Others: companies enjoy a high degree of 
internationalisation, having a vast international experience and establishing 
and developing positions in the foreign market. “The diversity of environments 
in which a firm operates may be a ‘key asset of the multinational firm’ since it 
provides the firm with a superior knowledge base” (Ghoshal, 1987:431, as cited in 
Madhok, 1997:42). This knowledge base arises from the acquired skills of 
particular markets and from “the greater interdependency of an internationalised 
network” (Hadley & Wilson, 2003). At this stage, companies have already the 
capacity and the need to integrate and coordinate market positions in a 
highly-internationalised context, sustaining and improving their positions. 
The chosen entry modes are usually joint-ventures, mergers and acquisitions 
or divestment (market integration strategy). 
 
BNs refer to companies in the industrial markets that establish and develop 
symbiotic business relationships throughout the network structure with other 
companies. Networking enhances competitive advantage and, according to 
Bachmann (1998), belonging to a network allows for mutual flexibility, joint use 
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of technical and economic knowledge and collective assumption of costs and 
risks. 
1 . 2 . 2 .  R e v i s e d  U - M o d e l  
Nowadays, markets are a network of relationships between companies. 
Companies do not compete at individual level, but rather at the network level, 
“including domestic or foreign suppliers and customers, as well as their customers and 
their suppliers” (Johanson & Mattsson, 1988). With the increasing globalism and fast 
development of information and communication technologies, the choice of the 
country and entry mode of a company is affected by the network and its position 
within it (Coviello & Munro, 1995, 1997; Martin, Swamminathan & Mitchel, 1998; 
Ellis, 2000). 
In this way, the network approach, that brought changes to the business 
landscape, was included in the last version of U-model (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009): 
 
Figure 5 – Revised Uppsala Model 
Source: Johanson & Vahlne (2009) 
 
Market knowledge – Knowledge Opportunities: as an insider of a network, the 
company has access to its knowledge. In the context of its network, the company 
can recognise and exploit opportunities, that outsiders cannot.  
Market commitment – Network position: the company’s internationalisation 
process takes place within the network; therefore, the addition of ‘network 
position’ to the model was crucial. Since ‘market commitment’ is too narrow, the 
company’s relations were included in the revised model. The knowledge, trust 
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and commitment of the firm in the context of its position in the network is more 
important than the size and flexibility of its investment in the market. 
Commitment decisions – Relationship commitment decisions: the word 
‘relationship’ was added in the revised model to enhance the company’s decision 
of further commitment in relationships within a specific country. In the context 
of relationships and networks, commitment is psychological; however, it is 
visible in terms of investment and organisational change and, more importantly, 
it is necessary to create mutual trust. 
Current activities – Learning, creating and trust-building: current activities are 
still crucial, but the revised model place more focus on the outcome of that 
activities. Experiential learning is present in both model’s versions and it is still 
the most important one; but, more learning forms and emotional elements were 
added to the last version, such as intellectual as well as social capital. Trust-
building is fundamental in the last version, since it includes the network 
perspective. 
 
There are other changes from the original to the revised U-model.  
 The psychic distance is now related with relationships and opportunities, 
liability of outsidership, rather than related with countries, liability of 
foreignness; 
 The revised model can explain large firms, since experience is more 
important than the size to acquire contextual knowledge; 
 It enhances the relationships of the firm as ownership advantage, rather 
than location as source of uncertainty; 
 The revised model is symmetric, since it describes the internationalisation 
of a firm’s value chain, both up and downstream; 






1.3.  BORN GLOBALS  
According to Knight and Cavusgil (2004, p.124) born globals are “business 
organizations that, from or near their founding, seek superior international business 
performance from the application of knowledge-based resources to the sale of outputs in 
multiple countries”. So, they are new firms with limited foreign business and 
experiential knowledge and suffer from liability of newness.  
The fast pace of technological developments in communication and production 
and the relentless competition of the global market forces companies to search 
innovativeness and to differentiate their products to not perish among 
competitors.  
Indeed, one of their main features is the capability to enter the international 
markets due to their “unique entrepreneurial competences and outlook” (Knight & 
Cavusgil 2004, p.129). Scholars believe that the education, vision and previous 
international experience of the entrepreneur are crucial for these young 
companies with limited knowledge, seeking for risky and complex markets 
(Madsen & Servais, 1997; Mathews & Zander, 2007; Zander et al., 2015). Moreover, 
the marketing orientation is also a very important factor to target and create 
value to foreign customers, maximising the company’s international 
performance. 
To overcome the liability of newness, born globals must develop technological 
knowledge to obtain competitive advantage over the foreign competitors, in 
terms of creation of superior products, with better effectiveness and efficiency in 
their production processes. In this way, “knowledge should be relatively unique and 
inimitable to maximize its utility for superior international performance” (Knight & 
Cavusgil 2004, p.136). One way of accelerating this learning process is to 
collaborate with foreign distributors and profit with their local knowledge to 
“respond rapidly to evolving customer needs, competitor actions, and shifting 
environmental contingencies” (Knight & Cavusgil, 2004, p.132). 
Overall, “innovation, R&D, knowledge development and capabilities leveraging” 
(Knight & Cavusgil, 2004, p.137) within born global firms are critical to their 
positioning and international success. 
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There are agreed specific characteristics of born globals: 
 There is a bigger incidence of born globals in nations with small internal 
markets; 
 Usually, they are companies that internationalise within 2 years of their 
inception (Rennie, 1993); 
 Organisational capabilities, especially international experience, vision, 
commitment, innovativeness and entrepreneurial orientation; 
 Strong market orientation, international marketing capabilities and 
adaptability to constant-changing conditions abroad; 
 High-value offerings of innovative and high-quality product that fit the 
customers need and wants, pursuing global niche markets; 
 More likely to be found in industries characterised by fast growth, high 
knowledge intensity and global interconnectedness; 
 Founders/Senior Leadership are responding to an internationalization 
premium that is made possible by lower costs and ubiquity of 
information, networking with and learning from international partners 
and efficient logistics. 
1 . 3 . 1 .  U - M o d e l  v s .  B o r n  G l o b a l s  
A comparison between the U-model and Born Globals is important to be done to 
realise the differences between the theories and the changes they both brought to 
international studies and knowledge. 
The U-model describes a slow process, concerned with the market uncertainty, 
low risk-taking and incremental acquisition of knowledge; these features are also 
true for born global firms. Yet, the main difference is born globals’ lack of 
routines to internationalise due to the founders and employees’ previous 
international experience, which lowers the perceived uncertainty of the foreign 
markets. Their characteristics, capabilities and knowledge about the foreign 
environment accelerate the commitment of businesses, opposed to the slow and 
incremental commitment of the U-model.  
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Speed of internationalisation. The traditional perspective requires experiential 
knowledge; thereby, the internationalisation process is slow and incremental, 
involving many people along the way and many years to acquire experience. 
Born global firms aim the international markets, so they are characterised by a 
rapid internationalisation of their activities. There are two main explanations. 
First, the vision of the top management and workers and their international 
knowledge, that facilitates and increases the speed of learning and 
internationalisation; second, their innovative capabilities of communication 
technologies help these firms to develop strategies and maintain relationships. 
Home market. In the traditional model, to support internationalisation, 
businesses must have a strong domestic market. The foreign market is considered 
a source of risk and uncertainty. For the born globals, the domestic market is less 
important, since they aim to internationalise their operations from or near to their 
inception; usually, is small or non-existent. They see the foreign market as a 
source of opportunities. They do not restrict their operations to a single country, 
but to the world, as they perceive it as one market. 
Psychic Distance. U-model give the first steps internationalising to 
psychologically proximate countries, where they perceive lower risk and 
uncertainty due to the similarities between home- and host-country. In the 
contemporary perspective, psychic distance could be important in a first phase 
of internationalisation. But as fast as born globals internationalise to 
psychologically near countries, they also move quickly to distant countries, 
giving less importance to psychic distance.  
Firm’s Strategy. Strategic decisions are not central as a motivation to 
internationalise in the U-model. While BGs, strategic decisions are crucial to 
determine the rhythm and focus of internationalisation, to face the competitors 
and occupy leading positions in niche markets. 
Importance of Networks. This is an important feature in both models. However, 
the U-model uses the network only in the early stages of the internationalisation 
process, making use of its knowledge-base and commitment, being later replaced 
by the firm’s own resources. For BGs, the network is a source of a vast 
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international knowledge, that allows extensive global reach, fast creation and 
multiple market exposure.  
 
Figure 6 compares the characteristics of the U-Model and the Born Global Theory 
and analyse their differences. 
 
Figure 6 – Uppsala Model vs. Born Globals 
Source: Adaptation of Pereira, M. C. (2015) 
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2. CROSS-BORDER ACQUISITIONS 
Cross-border acquisitions are referred in the literature as “one of the fastest ways 
to enter a foreign market” (Alba et al., 2009).  
A simple acquisition involves at least two companies; it “is the purchase by one 
company (the acquirer) of a substantial part of the assets or securities of another (target 
company)” (Krishnamurti & Vishwanath, 2008). Cross-border acquisitions are those 
involving “an acquirer firm and a target firm whose headquarters are located in different 
home countries” (Shimizu et al., 2004). 
Since the late 1800, M&As are considered a tool to the rapid expansion and 
growth of a business, which has been evolving throughout history. Usually, the 
literature refers to the five M&As waves starting from 1897 until 2000. However, 
it is important to refer the not-often-recognised sixth wave (Alexandridis et al., 
2012). 
 
Figure 7 shows the six waves of M&As founded in the literature (DePhamphlis, 
2001; Alexandridis et al., 2012; Martinson & Edgren, 2012), but only the last two 
waves have relevance for this study.  
 
 
Figure 7 – Waves of M&As 
Source: Adapted from Nouwen, T. J. A. (2011) 
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Fifth Wave. This was the first truly international wave. The world was globalised 
and suddenly, a large pool of markets, such as China and India were opening-
up. Soon, companies realised that would have to be big to face the competition 
of these new markets. Therefore, the 90s welcomed the world with mega-
mergers, showing the global firms’ greed to achieve greater economies of scale. 
Companies saw in cross-border acquisitions the opportunity to enter new 
markets and to establish a dominant position in an international or global scale. 
It came-up with a huge hype, but was shortly over, due to scandals, involving 
bankruptcy of well-known names, such as WorldCom and Enron.   
Sixth Wave. It started after the recovery from the recession of 2001, due to the 
stimulus given by the US Federal Reserve, which kept interest rates low to 
stimulate the economy. The low interest rates boosted the rise of Private Equity 
Funds and the stock market was booming, which provided a favourable 
environment for M&A transactions. At this stage, globalisation became a key-
concept in the business world and even the large and well-established companies 
felt the need to expand their operations to reach global markets. Signs of the fifth 
wave is still strongly visible in the sixth wave, but with larger benefits, since the 
government was more readily available and private equity funds were a great 
help. However, it all ended with the sub-prime crisis in the US, leading the world 
into a big recession once again.  
 
Cross-border acquisitions are characterised by their high valuation, deep 
pockets, cash payment and hostile deals, which create a complex and, sometimes, 
long process between the two companies (Hopkins, 1999; Moeller & Schlingemann, 
2005). This is the reason why the decision of doing an acquisition should be done 
with some precautions and intense planning, so that it can be considered a 
success when implemented (Papadakis, 2007). According to Gomes et al. (2013, 
p.16), “of key importance is the ability of firms to manage the transition from pre-




2 . 1 .  M o t i v e s  o f  M & A s  
Throughout history the M&As landscape has changed and globalisation brought 
new corporate challenges (Cartwright, 1998), due to cultural and geographic 
distances, governance differences, currency, compensation policies and legal 
formalities (Erel et al., 2012; Rottig, 2007).  
According to Napier et al. (1989), there are two motives to acquire: the financial 
motives, that maximise the businesses’ value, and non-financial, that is a non-
maximising value strategy. However, Brouthers, Van Hastenburg & Van der Ven 
(1998) suggested three categories of motives to acquire: 
 
 
Figure 8 – Motives to merge or acquire a company 
Sources: Brouthers et al., 1998; Johnson et al., 2011; Gomes et al., 2011 
 
The motives of cross-border acquisitions were once to improve companies’ 
competitive position, introduce new brands, spread the financial risk and achieve 
economies of scale. Nowadays, the most relevant motives behind an acquisition 
are market share growth and synergies, followed by competence-based, 





Despite all the over-optimism of managers, the rate of acquisitions’ failure is 
around 50-75% (Swerdlow et al., 2001; Papadakis, 2005; Sirower, 1997). There have 
been some M&As with high expectations for a brilliant future that ended up 
labelled has catastrophic failures. The weakest point on M&As is the integration 
phase, where many companies still stumble. 
Having in mind that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution, past research points 
some reasons for failure, since poor planning and choices during negotiations 
(pre-acquisition phase) to poor communication and integration, due to cultural 
clashes or inability to reach synergies (post-acquisition phase) (Gomes et al., 2013). 
 
Figure 9 – Pre- and Post-Acquisition Phases 
2 . 2 .  P r e - a c q u i s i t i o n  p h a s e  
Before the acquisition, it should be conducted a ‘due diligence’ and partner 
analyses to make sure that the M&A is the right choice. To conduct these 
analyses, it was developed matrices that were firstly focused on the businesses 
‘fit’ with their external environments, being in an attractive/unattractive 
position. Later, it was developed the Parenting Matrix (Goold et al., 1994), focusing 
on the ‘fit’ between the capabilities of the parent company and the acquisition 
target to avoid the potential problem of identifying an attractive target but to 
miss on building synergies. This matrix, more than focus on the capabilities fit, it 
also analyses the potential internal synergies between the parties and what the 
target needs to do to achieve external advantage. The negotiation is crucial, 
where the premiums are defined, as well as the plan to the post-acquisition 
phase. At this time, the parties can never lose focus on the strategy and vision, in 
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order to avoid difficulties in post-acquisition integration. Over-optimism in the 
M&A potential resources or integration, incorrect evaluation of ‘black holes’ or 
overpayment are deadly mistakes that compromise a M&A from the beginning. 
2 . 3 .  P o s t - a c q u i s i t i o n  p h a s e  
According to Malekzadeh and Nahavandi (1998, p.125), “acquiring another firm is the 
easy part; the hard part is managing the long-term process of acculturation of two firms 
across national border”. 
After the acquisition is usually when the problems began to arise. The leadership 
should be quickly established; here, the decision is if the top management should 
stay or leave, bringing an outsider. While keeping the top management (insider) 
has the advantages of maintaining the culture and retain specific and valuable 
knowledge, providing leadership continuity and possibility to change things fast; 
it has also disadvantages, since it can constitute an obstacle to change. Bringing 
an outsider can provide new and more open approaches and be more objective 
in the tasks to be done; however, it outsider has a lack of understanding of 
company’s culture and can take longer to implement the expected goals. Either 
way, communication is a critical part of this process, especially in managing 
cultural integration, avoiding cultural clashes. Middle managers should be 
included throughout this process to feel part of this change and to be the voice of 
blue collars (Angwin, 2012).  
 
There are studies discussing various integration typologies, in which the majority 
examine cultural cohesion and differences (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988; 
Cartwright & Cooper, 1992), rather than organisational change. Later Haspeslagh 
and Jemison (1991) founded four integration strategies, based on a resource-based 
perspective on the transfer of capabilities between both the parent and the 
acquired firms, creating value and protecting “the acquired company from 





Figure 10 – Integration Strategies 
Source: Haspeslagh & Jemison (1991) 
 
If the cross-border acquisition respects and follows the stages of the process, 
giving as much attention to the due diligence and negotiation, as to the 
integration of the company, the acquisition may be considered a success in the 
future. The parent company becomes more powerful, internationalised and with 
valuable resources, skills and/or technology, improving its performance and 
sustaining its long-term strategy.  
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3. FIRM INTERNATIONALISATION & CROSS-BORDER ACQUISITIONS 
As the world is changing, including the economic, technological and social 
conditions, so are the businesses. With the rapid advancements in 
communications and transport, the world is more interconnected than ever. For 
businesses, it means that costs are reduced and businesses to distant countries 
are done at a lower cost than before. Moreover, the growing numbers of 
internationalised executives create the opportunity for a business to rise faster. 
According to Kumar (2008), the motivations for cross-border acquisitions shifted 
from market-seeking strategies, used during the 1970s and 80s, to strategic asset-
seeking strategies recently, such as technology, recognised brands, access to new 
customers and worldwide distribution channels.  
Cross-border acquisitions are a fast way to access new markets, customers, new 
brands or distribution channels.  
To connect the various concepts and theories with the key research question – 
how do cross-border acquisitions influence the firm internationalisation – a 
model was built to present the factors that have, according to the reviewed 
literature, a determining role in the firms’ internationalisation process. 
Nonetheless, it is essential to understand how each of these elements interact and 
effect the process. It was possible to connect the identified factors with both 
topics. 
For instance, the motives, business network internationalization and the process 
of acquisition are deeply related with the features of cross-border acquisitions; 
while leadership and vision, competitive advantage and strategy are in closer 
relation with firm internationalisation. 
 
 






CHAPTER 2:  
RESEARCH METHODS 
1. RESEARCH STRATEGY 
The key research question of this study is how cross-border acquisitions 
influence firm internationalisation and to answer it, it will be used the case study 
research approach. 
Yin (2009) argues that the case study research is a method that is chosen when 
the phenomenon under study is not distinguished from its context and in which 
multiple sources of evidence are used.  
According to Creswell (2013), the “case study research involves the study of an issue 
explored through one or more cases within a bounded system (a setting, a context)”. This 
research will use multiple case study, where the inquirer selects more than one 
case, showing different perspectives on the illustrated issue. Yin (2003) suggests 
that multiple case studies use a logic of replication of the procedures for each 
case. However, as general rule, qualitative researchers are hesitant to generalise 
from one case to another, since the contexts differ (Baxter & Jack, 2008). 
 
The investigation, for purposes, can be classified as: 
 Exploratory, in which concepts are explored, describes experiences, the 
cultural system from the point of view of the organisation; 
 Descriptive, in which phenomena are explored and described, in this case 
the internationalisation process through cross-border acquisitions, the 
characteristics of the company and its relations with business partners in 
the international market. 
 
Indeed, Gomez et al. (1996, p.99), state that the overall objective of a case study is 
to "explore, describe, explain, evaluate and/or transform". 
Whatever the type of scientific study, be it a quantitative study or a qualitative 
study, the concept of reliability in this context is related to the possibility of 
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reapplying the conclusions reached, with the possibility of several researchers 
can arrive at similar results on the same phenomenon studied using the same 
instruments. In fact, it is a matter of assessing whether the data collected in the 
research are stable over time and have internal consistency, especially if they 
come from a variety of sources. 
In a quantitative study the reliability requirement is easily achievable. In a case 
study, reliability assurance becomes more difficult to achieve, because the 
investigator is the primary, and often only ‘instrument’ of the study, since the 
‘case’ itself cannot be replicated or rebuilt. However, the question of reliability 
cannot be ignored if the case study is to be recognised as having relevance and 
value. However, the methodology used in this exploratory study was qualitative 
in nature. 
 
This project was developed in two Portuguese companies, Sogrape and Cotesi, 
through a multiple case study research, proposing to observe their 
characteristics, analyse their mode of operation within the business networks, 
their internationalisation process and the measures adopted for their growth and 
survival in the international market, especially through cross-border 
acquisitions, that due to business globalisation, has become a hot topic in the IB 
literature. 
2. DATA COLLECTION 
In the process of data collection, the case study uses several techniques of 
qualitative research, namely, observation and the interviews. However, it was 
also used quantitative methods; exploratory questionnaires to find general 
characteristics, test theories and hypotheses and possibly produce new theory 
and statistics of world trade and FDI to support this study.  
According to Bourdieu et al. (1968, p.72), "the questionnaire presupposes a whole set of 
exclusions: to know how to establish a questionnaire and to know what to do of the facts 
produced by it, it is necessary to know what the questionnaire produces, that is, among 
other things, what which it cannot reach”. It is, therefore, indispensable to 
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“methodically discern declarations of intent, actions and declarations of action, which 
can establish, with actual behaviour, relationships ranging from exaggeration of 
valorisation or omission for concern with secrecy to deformations, reinterpretations and 
even selective forgetting”. 
The use of these different instruments is a way of obtaining data of different 
types, which provide the possibility of crossing information. 
 
More objectively, the data was collected from the:  
 Analysis of the national and international literature on firms’ 
internationalisation, business networks, born globals and M&As; 
 Analysis of the existing literature on the business sector; 
 Questionnaires and interviews used to carry out the empirical study, 
administered to some important employees of the companies. They were 
fundamental to collect general information about the organisational 
background, internationalisation process and FDI of the companies 
involved, the short and long-term strategies for the growth and 
sustainability of the business and the results achieved; in this sense, semi-
structured interviews were conducted, where the questions were both 
open, giving enough freedom to the interviewee, and closed, in which the 
interviewee had to choose between a typified list of answers (Lima, 2000, 
p.27). 
 
Although the most common data collection methods in the case study research 
are observation and interviews, no method has been devalued in this work. The 
methods of collecting information were chosen according to the task to be 
accomplished.  
In this way, several sources of evidence or data were used to allow, at the same 
time, different perspectives of the study participants and obtain several 
interpretations of the same phenomenon, creating conditions for a triangulation 
of data during the analysis phase. 
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3. DATA ANALYSIS 
According to Yin (1994, p.92), the use of multiple data sources in the construction 
of a case study allows us to consider a more diverse set of analysis topics and 
simultaneously allows to corroborate the same phenomenon. The objective is to 
understand the event under study and at the same time to develop more generic 
theories about the observed phenomenon. 
The data collected from the interviews’ transcripts and the questionnaires was 
analysed, focusing on finding particularities in the chosen case studies, when 
compared to the existing IB literature, about cross-border acquisitions and firm 
internationalisation.  
From there, it was necessary to connect the dots, finding the relationships 
between the concepts to draw a general profile of the phenomenon studied, 
bringing new ideas to the literature. 
4. ETHICAL CONDUCT 
When the research involves human participants, it must be conducted in a way 
which respects the dignity, rights and welfare of participants.  
To this end, it was first necessary to contact the companies selected for the project: 
Sogrape and Cotesi. In a first approach, a letter of presentation from the 
researcher was sent out, clearly and concisely indicating the purpose of the study 
(Appendix I). 
To obtain the authorisation of the companies and, in compliance with their right 
to anonymity and confidentiality, permission was requested to disclose company 
data. Similarly, consent was requested to use the study participants' personal 
data, if companies allowed some of their collaborators to be interviewed, as well 
as their acceptance to collaborate (Appendix II). 
Otherwise, in the respect for privacy and non-participation, anonymity would be 
used, as well as name of firm and fictitious personal names, a situation that was 
not verified in the present study. 
 
29 
At the same time as the letter of presentation/authorisation, a questionnaire was 
sent out stating the purpose of the investigation, with a view to obtaining valid 
answers to the research questions asked or the hypotheses formulated, with a 
view to ensuring maximum reliability of the data (Appendix III). 
Subsequently, the researcher travelled to the companies to conduct interviews 
with those responsible for the organisation, who kindly agreed and made 
available their collaboration in this project. 
 
Next chapter, named as The Cases of Sogrape and Cotesi, presents each 
company. After a brief presentation of the organisational background and 
history, it follows the analysis of their internationalisation process, main markets, 
long-term strategy of growth and sustainability and what role did business 
networks played throughout all the process.    
Finally, it will be discussed the effect that cross-border acquisitions had in the 
internationalisation process of both companies. 
In this way, rigor and vigilance were maintained in each of the phases to avoid 









CHAPTER 3:  
THE CASES OF SOGRAPE AND COTESI 
1. SOGRAPE VINHOS 
[The text written in quotation marks was said by Dr. Hélder Gomes da Silva, during 
the interview] 
Sogrape Vinhos borne out from the will of Fernando van Zeller Guedes to create 
and develop a different and innovative company, capable of making and 
promoting Portuguese wines in international markets.  
Innovation “is a very important role, which is intended to give even more relevance now 
and in the future (…) why? Sogrape appears with Mateus Rosé. Mateus was completely 
disruptive and ground-breaking at the time it came”. Against all the odds, Sogrape 
Vinhos was created “in 1942, in full World War II”, with a pink wine, sold in bottles 
with the shape of the soldiers’ flasks. So, “in 1942, a pink wine, with the objective of 
exporting in that international environment of war (…) there is no more innovative 
example than this, that is in the genesis of the company”.  
Always focused on a long-term strategy and exportation of innovative wines, 
Sogrape Vinhos in a scenario of instability and uncertainty, looked for markets 
with low psychic distance, such as Brazil, Angola and Mozambique. The founder 
and still owner of the company, Fernando van Zeller Guedes, believed that the 
UK was the "‘World’s Showcase’ and that he who conquered English tastes would have 
the doors to the international market flung open”, this was the ultimate goal.  
Mateus conquered the world wine consumer and in the end of the 80’s, Sogrape 
Vinhos asserted itself as a prominent leader among Portuguese wine companies, 








Figure 12 shows the cycle of Sogrape’s cross-border acquisitions in the 
productive and distributive activities. 
 
Figure 12 – Sogrape’s cross-border acquisitions 
 
The world of wines is divided in two: the old and the new world. The Old-World 
Wines are the wines from countries or regions where winemaking was first 
originated, such as France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece or Germany. The New-
World Wines are those from countries or regions where winemaking was 
imported during and after the age of exploration, such as United States, 
Australia, South Africa, Chile, Argentina and New Zealand. 
The story goes back to the year of 1976, where happened a revolution in the wines 
world. On the May 24th, a ‘blind’ tasting in Paris, with French and American 
wines, shook the world of wine and produced consequences that last to this day.  
The ‘Judgment of Paris’ was revolutionary, because it undermined the 
supremacy of French wines. Until 1970, Europe was the one and only leading 
producer of wines. After this event and the gained prestige of American wines, 
European markets opened to the New World, boosting production expansion to 
countries, such as Argentina, Chile and New Zealand.  
 
1997. The first cross-border acquisition was in Argentina and, therefore, it was 
the one that changed and started to place Sogrape in the sphere of cross-border 
acquisitions thought. But more than pursuing new markets and different wines, 




Despite the exportation country targets had low psychic distance, the company’s 
first cross-border acquisition was in a country with high psychic distance. 
However, there was a “set of objectives that existed at the time that ended up justifying 
this investment”.  
Therefore, 20 years ago, “Argentina was in the new world and was one of the ‘hot’ 
origins, very attractive, growing immensely”. Sogrape acquired Finca Flichman, 
because it had “a trajectory and a huge growth potential (…) there was a target in a 
relevant origin, in a strong international expansion and that was presented as very 
attractive, in terms of potential growth, opening new doors, for example, in the USA, the 
Argentine origin was at the time and also today very relevant to the US market and this 
was one of the synergies that was sought, which is to put Portuguese wines – which are 
much less in the US market – in conjunction with Argentine wines”. 
2000. Evaton is an imports’ company that has been working with Sogrape since 
1991, responsible for the distribution and promotion of Sogrape’s brands and 
wines in the USA.  
“Evaton is a different experience, because the US market itself has very specific 
characteristics. In the case of the USA, this works differently. We continue to have 
Sogrape Vinhos in Portugal, as a company that owns the brands, the producer; then, there 
is something here in the middle, it is the figure of the importer, which in the USA cannot 
be distributor; and finally, there must have a distributor”.  
The USA is one of the biggest world wine markets, “if we look only to the geographic 
space that occupies the USA, it is the size of Europe. And it is divided into states, where 
these states are much larger than some markets in Europe itself”.  
In this way, Sogrape opted to invest in an importer rather than in a distributor, 
since “here we had the influence and ability to really invest and have a stake”. It did not 
invest in an American distributor, since it “was very difficult, they are huge 
companies and we could hardly get into the capital of such a company”. Moreover, even 
if Sogrape had invested in a distributor, “we would have to have an intermediary (…) 
they would necessarily have in the middle to have an importer, who would not be part of 




2002. This was the first investment in the UK, in Stevens Garnier, later changed 
to what is known today as Sogrape UK.  
In the beginning, “Sogrape had a minority stake and then increased its share of capital 
up to 100%. (…) It was a wine distribution company and over the years Sogrape has been 
transferring its brands to this company”. This company had been associated with 
Sogrape for more than 20 years, representative of almost the entire Sogrape 
brands’ portfolio. 
The market of UK was very important to Sogrape since its foundation, existing a 
“historical relationship of this market to Sogrape”. 
The motives for this acquisition, “more than the company, it was the UK market. For 
a company like Sogrape, which sells wines, the UK market is one of the major world 
markets. For years, the USA is the largest market in the world, there are other years where 
it is the UK. And the UK, being as important as the USA, for example, has a specific 
feature, which is: it has no relevant wine production. The USA produces wine in 
California and the USA imports 20%, while the UK imports practically all the wine it 
consumes. Therefore, it is a large and buying market, which is why it is very important 
for Sogrape”. In this way, “the entry into Stevens Garnier has this goal: it is a very 
relevant market and we want to have more influence on the distribution”. 
2007/08. Sogrape made two important acquisitions. In 2007, it acquired 
Framingham Wines, New Zealand, completing its portfolio with the white 
wines of the Sauvignon Blanc caste. In 2008, it bought Chateau de los Boldos, a 
270-hectare farm, in Chile, considered to have an exceptional microclimate to 
produce premium wines. 
2012. In this year, Sogrape enters for the first time in Spain, with the acquisition 
of Bodegas LAN. “It was also a very important step. Why? Because it is an origin in 
Spain, in which Sogrape has defined, very clearly, that it is very important for its 
development as a company”. 
This company was a relevant acquisition, since it was a holder of a recognized 
brand portfolio and represents the entry into one of the main wine producing 




2017. This was the last acquisition made by Sogrape in the UK, in the distribution 
company, Liberty Wines. It is not a 100% stake, it is a minority stake for now.  
However, it is a relevant acquisition, since it is done in a scenario marked by 
instability and uncertainty brought by and with Brexit. “That is, at a time when, 
apparently, there are political, economic and social constraints in a country like this, 
Sogrape decided to bet”, enhancing and reinforcing the focus on long-term 
strategies followed by the company.  
This decision was not a response to Brexit, but rather a reinforcement of 
Sogrape’s position in the UK. “Sogrape's strategy focus on long-term, which makes 
events of more limited impact in time, such as Brexit, have less relevance. What am I 
saying? That for Sogrape, the UK market is relevant now, in 5 years and in 30 years. So, 




Figure 13 – Sogrape’s acquisitions type  
 
All these acquisitions were done to strengthen the international position and 
implementing the strategy outlined for the sustainability of Sogrape's business. 
“It has to do with giving greater importance to more important markets and with more 
influence in the sales force”. 
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1.1.  PRE-ACQUISITION PHASE  
The choice of the strategic partner does not tell the same story “in all cases and 
there are several situations that can trigger an acquisition. It is often the 
predisposition of a company, in a certain market and an opportunity arises (…) 
And there are other cases where there is an active posture of seeking concrete 
targets. There is no common pattern”. 
Moreover, Sogrape does not look for leader companies in their markets, but for 
specific characteristics, such as the brands’ profile, the region in which is located 
or the dimension of the company. “That is, when you put ‘check’ in the set of 
characteristics that are identified as relevant to that market, then the player is eligible to 
be analysed”. 
In Argentina, the strategic partner was analysed due to its potential of growth in 
a ‘hot region’ in the new-world wines; the USA and UK are core markets, with 
well-established distribution networks, where “the relationships are long-lasting, 
not occasional”; and Spain, since it is one of the biggest producer countries in 
Europe and Sogrape did not have this origin yet, capable of creating valuable 
synergies among its subsidiaries. So, “one of the main drivers was the relevance of the 
players, specifically in the market”. 
Sogrape acquired companies in the same sector, having the necessary ‘feel’ for 
the businesses and their needs. “That is, when we buy in Spain origin, it is because 
we do not have this origin, this competence. When we buy a stronger distributor in the 
UK, it is because there is already a distribution chain that we do not have yet, its range 
of customers, its reputation and these are very valuable resources”. So, Sogrape is 
acquiring capabilities and know-how, resources that are rare and valuable to 
strengthen its businesses and position in a cross-border context.  
The acquired companies offered opportunities for synergies, “in commercial terms, 
there have been increasingly synergies created (…) The distribution company itself, as it 
has wines from Portugal, Spain, New Zealand... all together are stronger. And perhaps 
there are customers who only looked for suppliers who have at least Spain and New 
Zealand and we have so far not been able to get into those who demanded Spain. And, for 
the origin of New Zealand, this customer was not a hypothesis and happened to be, 
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because the company bought a company in the region of Rioja. (…) I think this is one of 
the main advantages that have been verified over the years”; access to new markets and 
their consumers. In return, they use the reputable, premium brand of Sogrape 
Vinhos, distinguished worldwide, as well as its capabilities, know-how and 
connections in the wine world.  
Regarding the negotiation process, Sogrape had two experiences; or the target 
companies are in a formal sale process or it is an informal process between two 
interested parties. 
In the former case, the negotiation process is organised. It has several phases, 
where the interested players in buying pass by elimination rounds until one 
player is chosen to properly negotiate price, conditions of purchase and sale, etc., 
reaching to the final deal.  
“Then there is another kind of experience, which is when an opportunity arises out of an 
organized process, as was the case of the latter, Liberty Wines”. The negotiation process 
in this case was longer, since it was an informal procedure, in which the parties 
were having meetings according to their availability to determine the price and 
conditions of the deal. 
The deals were achieved, after the processes of due diligence and negotiation, 
“undoubtedly, in every acquisition process there was an analysis of the strategic 
purposes. If this does not happen, the acquisition will not happen”. 
1.2.  POST-ACQUISITION PHASE  
“You cannot impose things that can be very wrong in different countries”. Having this 
in mind, Sogrape is very attentive to its acquired companies, “what habits it has, 
what culture it lives, what is relevant to those people, who are the people who are in the 
administration and how do they manage their teams, how do they do this leadership 
exercise; and then, where improvement areas are identified, are suggested and put to 
consideration. The process is very careful”.  
Sogrape has production and distribution in different parts of the globe and when 
a company plays in an international sphere, there are more challenges and 
difficulties. Whether the acquisitions are in Argentina or in more developed 
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countries, such as USA and UK, “there are always cultures and habits that are 
completely different and these processes are challenging”. 
Even within the same country, producing wine “is not the same in all regions. 
Producing wine in Argentina, Chile, New Zealand, Portugal and Spain – which are the 
5 production origins of Sogrape – is done differently. There are some principles that 
everyone has, but it is not exactly the same in all places”. However, despite some 
procedures and habits are adopted by the acquired company and “the identity can 
be shaped, it is never totally altered. They have their habits and ways of thinking and 
working, which are being adapted, but they continue to be very characteristic of 
themselves”. 
Regarding to the management team, Sogrape always tried to maintain the top 
management, retaining the firms’ specific knowledge, that is hard to replace and 
give continuity to the leadership, avoiding negative reactions and uncertainty 
among employees. However, “we have a little bit of both experiences. (…) In the case 
of Chile, they have already been more than one Portuguese General Director and, at the 
moment, there is a Chilean and came from outside. That is, when you bought a company, 
the General Director became Portuguese, placed in the meantime - and for various reasons 
- has already left and was hired an external person. In Spain, there was in fact the 
maintenance of the entire team and only the Chief Financial Officer was Portuguese there. 
So, it was a specific, timely change. And the rest of the management held”. Therefore, 
despite the control Sogrape has over its subsidiaries’ operations, they are run 
independently by their management team.  
 
Sogrape was a company with an internationalisation strategy since its 
foundation. In plain WWII, it began exporting Mateus Rosé, despite all the 
difficulties the entire world was exposed to.  
Determined to make the Portuguese wines’ quality and uniqueness known 
worldwide, Sogrape began a cycle of cross-border acquisitions of the most 
important global producers and distributors, owning a larger panoply of wine 




2. COTESI – COMPANHIA DE TÊXTEIS SINTÉTICOS, S.A. 
[The text written in quotation marks was said by Eng. Rui Marques, during the interview] 
In 1943, a small factory called Corfi is born, which would be the origin of the 
Violas Group. It started in the industry sector and, throughout its history, it 
widened its interests to tourism, real estate, leisure, banking and food. 
“Cotesi – Companhia de Têxteis Sintéticos, S.A. was founded in 1967 and was the 
forerunner in Europe in the production of twine, nets and ropes made from synthetic and 
natural raw materials. Today, Cotesi is the world’s largest producer of Baler Twine”. 
The globalised world brought a panoply of new challenges for business, among 
them fierce competition of emerging countries. They came with low prices of 
inputs and products, low-cost workforce, making things hard for developed 
economies where quality was before price.  
Cotesi suffered a decay in the 90s, because it was incapable of competing with 
emerging countries – China, India, Turkey. In 1999, Cotesi was forced to shut 
down a factory, where the main input was hard labour, employing 800 workers. 
Since then, the investment has been done in technology and technological plants. 
The emerging countries could compete with traditional companies, but not with 
technology, “only if they can work better than the machine, which they cannot. It's the 
technological difference”. 
So, the option “was start protecting our business”. How? “At European level, we 
bought our largest customers. We bought them all. It lasted longer or less time, but we 











Figure 14 presents Cotesi’s cycle of cross-border acquisitions, starting from 1996 
until COFRA’s acquisition in 2008. 
 
 
Figure 14 – Cotesi's cross-border acquisitions 
 
1996. Cotesi made its first acquisition in United Kingdom of a long-standing 
partner. “It was an English family, it was a company that had no internet and, being in 
Yorkshire, it could be the biggest company and distributor of ropes in England”. 
With no descendants to keep running the company, Cotesi saw the opportunity 
to acquire it, since “it was our greatest customer of ropes. On Cotesi's side, there was 
much interest in the British market”. 
Today, it is a supplier of premium package of products oriented to the Marine, 
Fishing, Safety, Defence and Agriculture and a market leader in the UK. 
 
Until 2003, the company had already bought the distribution companies in 
Denmark, UK, Germany and Belgium. These subsidiaries were of a great 
importance for the internationalisation process, since they provided the control 
over the distribution channels in Europe. LP Weidemann (Denmark) was the 
distributor for the Scandinavian agricultural market; Cotesi UK was the 
distributor for one of the most important markets for Cotesi, the UK; and Fybron, 
in Belgium, had its delegations in Europe and in the USA. 
However, these acquisitions arose as opportunities, not as a part of Cotesi’s 
strategy. When the company began to stumble, the strategy was to fortify the 




2003. This year was the beginning of the investment cycle in the American 
continent, strengthening the Cotesi’s productive and distribution activities. 
In the USA, the story was different. It was a technologically advanced company 
managed by Canadians and the biggest Cotesi’s competitor in the USA market. 
Suddenly, the group had problems and went bankrupt, emerging the 
opportunity to be acquired. Once again, Cotesi did not hesitate and bought it; 
“the company was closed for 47 days. After 47 days, the company opened with a different 
name [from Polytwine to Polyexcel]”. 
Polytwine was “a leading company and the whole market recognized that that company 
was the largest American wireline company”. In this way, Cotesi could assure its 
position in the American market and become more innovative, with all the 
advanced technology of its, until then, competitor.  
Today, Polyexcel in an American manufacturer of premium quality Baler Twine, 
always looking for new products in the future of farming. 
In Brazil, Cotesi acquired a “historical supplier of the group”, that was a reference 
in the market, being the “largest distributor of fibre in Latin America”. This company 
is a productive facility to export to North-American market.  
2005/06. The acquisitions continued in the American continent, USA and 
Canada.  
Until ten years ago, Cotesi was one more Portuguese company in the USA. 
Today, it represents “80% of the largest sales force, the largest USA national 
distributor (…) at the present, are the leader. We have three companies in the USA and 
one company in Canada, and we are leaders. In our area of activity, we are leaders”. 
2008. The last and longest acquisition process was in France, taking 6 years to 
be completed. This company was Cotesi’s “biggest client” and it was a peculiar 
buyout made by Cotesi, since it bought two competing companies, whose hatred 
between them had lasted for 30 years.  
However, “it is now a company called Cotesi France. In the agricultural part, they were 
together in a company that is now called Cotesi França [COFRA]” and it is a leader 






Figure 15 – Cotesi’s acquisitions by type  
2.1.  PRE-ACQUISITION PHASE  
When Cotesi suffers a decay in the late 1990s and to become once again leader in 
the market, Cotesi started a long process of cross-border acquisitions of its major 
clients. But the idea was not to buy just its clients, “the idea was to buy leading 
companies in every market”. Therefore, the strategic partner did not go through a 
deep process of due diligence, since they were Cotesi’s clients and the 
relationship was long-standing. “In the UK, USA, Brazil and France, there was a very 
strong relationship between Cotesi's owners and their distributors. Being the distributor 
of a Portuguese company out there, first and foremost, there had to be trust”.  
Because of the long courtship period, each company knew the potential 
acquisition’s value.  The acquisitions were built on long-term relationships and 
trust, where “the purchase itself was a consequence of something that lasted a long time” 







2.2.  POST-ACQUISITION PHASE  
This stage is mostly marked by the integration strategies followed by the parent 
company.  
Cotesi acquired companies in different countries, which means different farming 
conditions, resources and techniques. Known as a master of pursuing proactive 
technical innovation and differentiation, the acquisitions were, beyond achieving 
position in the cross-border markets, to gain new capabilities and technology to 
continuously develop and improve its products.  
Throughout all the acquisition processes, the communication played a crucial 
role. The details, rules, strategies and intentions were clearly defined, so in the 
end all the parties were plain satisfied with the outcome.  
Cotesi tried always to follow the same strategy in all acquisitions; “the company's 
strategy was to keep the identity of the companies we bought”. It attempted to keep the 
top management, using insiders, in order to retain the firm specific knowledge 
and because it is hard to replace; moreover, it avoids employees’ uncertainty and 
negative reactions.  
In the USA, after 47 days of closure, “the company opened with a different name, 90% 
of the employees were the same and the owners were us”. So, businesses continue to be 
managed by Americans and Canadians; in France, as well. (…) Except for the UK, where 
a Portuguese is there”. The former owner of the British company “was going to 
reform, on condition that he would stay there for two or three years to secure the passage”. 
It is a particular case, because, in the beginning, “who stayed there was number two” 
of the former owner – an insider. However, due to some management problems, 
it was necessary to bring an outsider, a Portuguese manager to the UK’s 
subsidiary. 
 
Since its foundation, Cotesi was never aiming the domestic market, but rather 
the global market. “The Portuguese market for Cotesi never meant much, except for 
very few exceptions. (…) we have always been exporters in the order of 98%”, as Eng. 
Rui Marques referred.  
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Always focused on the most advanced technological innovations and on 
continuous R&D, and after the rounds of cross-border acquisitions, Cotesi can 
promptly say that it is the world’s largest producer of baler twine and leader in 








CHAPTER 4:  
DISCUSSION 
This chapter will analyse the effect that cross-border acquisitions had in the 
internationalisation process of Sogrape and Cotesi presented above. 
These companies started their entry in foreign markets through exports, 
demonstrating few interest in the Portuguese market, strong international 
marketing and orientation for their innovative products. They both grew through 
cross-border acquisitions, becoming leading companies in the global market.  
Aiming a more rigorous discussion of the cases studied, it was necessary to create 
a new theoretical framework, adjusting some concepts and adding novelties to 
the existing literature. 
 
 
Figure 16 – A posteriori theoretical framework 
4.1.  TRIGGERS FOR CROSS-BORDER ACQUISITIONS  
Based on the data retrieved from the case studies, Sogrape and Cotesi began their 
cross-border acquisitions cycle when confronted with new competition or a 
competitor bankruptcy. 
 
Sogrape. The emergence of the new-world wines created a fierce competition, 
successfully presenting wines of international castes and gaining significant 
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market shares. In this way, Sogrape made its first cross-border acquisition in 
Argentina, in 1997.  
Cotesi. The cycle of cross-border acquisitions began in 1996, in the distribution 
activities. However, it arose as an opportunity and not as part of Cotesi’s 
internationalisation strategy. So, the first relevant cross-border acquisition was 
in 2003, in the USA, when confronted with the emerging countries, such as China, 
India and Turkey, and their low-cost products. 
Moreover, another important trigger was the bankruptcy of this company, 
biggest competitor in the American market. As this company was technologically 
advanced, it was the opportunity for Cotesi to acquire the only thing that could 
face and overcome the emerging countries, technology.  
4.2.  PSYCHIC D ISTANCE  
The U-model suggests that companies first internationalise to psychologically 
proximate countries, gradually expanding to countries with greater 
psychological distance. 
However, the two cases presented are contradictory with the literature, since 
their first cross-border acquisition shows high psychic distance. Sogrape acquires 
Finca Flichman, in Argentina, and Cotesi acquires Polyexcel, in the USA.  
According to Zhang (2014), psychic distance is characterised by the “differences in 
political, economic, cultural and environmental aspects of the home and host countries 
when the enterprises conduct international operations activities”. 
Argentina and the USA are two countries where the political, economic, cultural 
and environment are different from Portugal.  
So, in this study, it is possible to observe that cross-border acquisitions increase 
the firms’ internationalisation into high psychic distance. 
4.3.  BUSINESS NETWORK POSITION AND CONTROL  
Sogrape and Cotesi were exporter entities since their foundation, positioned in a 
foreign network, meaning that they are in constant contact with foreign actors. 
Therefore, in the late 1990s, they were considered ‘international among others’, 
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having the need to integrate and coordinate market positions, sustaining and 
improving their positions.  
The greatest difference from the U-model to the revised U-model is that the 
internationalisation is no longer analysed from the firm’s perspective, but rather 
from the perspective of the firm within its business network. Thus, the 
knowledge, trust and commitment of the firm are considered more important 
than the size and flexibility of its investment. 
With an insider’s perspective, these companies could recognise the opportunities 
within their networks. Their cross-border acquisition processes began in the 
1990s, considered the era of mega-mergers, which the main outcome was 
globalisation, bringing new challenges and fierce competition from emergent 
markets.  
 
Sogrape. It acquired the importation/distribution subsidiaries based on the 
“long-lasting” relationship and trust they had with its business partners; Evaton, 
USA, was bought in 2000, but they have been doing business with Sogrape since 
1991; and Stevens Garnier, acquired in 2002, has been doing business with 
Sogrape for more than 20 years. In this way, Sogrape reinforced and strengthened 
its position in its core markets and took control over its distribution networks. 
The other acquisitions arose as business opportunities, through contacts within 
the network. 
Cotesi. Cotesi’s cross-border acquisitions were based on the knowledge about 
the partners’ operations, know-how, technology and trust, since that they were 
its major clients.  
However, the acquisition of COFRA is peculiar. COFRA is the junction of two 
competing companies, whose hatred had last for more than 20 years, according 
to Eng. Rui Marques. To gain the control over the French market, Cotesi bought 
the two companies that together had “25, 30% of market share”. 
With the acquisitions of the subsidiaries in Denmark, UK, Belgium, Germany and 
France, Cotesi strengthened its control over the distribution in Europe, gaining 
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independence from its agents and conquered the north-american market with the 
production and distribution there. 
 
With the acquisitions of long-standing partners, Sogrape and Cotesi took control 
of their up and downstream activities, even if for that end, Cotesi had to buy two 
competing companies to conquer one core market. 
One idea is consistent, the more importer/distributor cross-border acquisitions, 
the more distribution control for internationalisation. 
4.4.  CAREFUL PROCESS OF ACQUISITION  
An acquisition is always a risky move, but a cross-border acquisition involves 
much more than the organisational change and adaptation. It requires a careful 
process, since the right choice of the strategic partner to the integration of 
different organisations, regarding culture, values and customers.  
4 . 4 . 1 .  P r e - a c q u i s i t i o n  P h a s e  
4 . 4 . 1 . 1 .  C h o i c e  o f  t h e  S t r a t e g i c  P a r t n e r  
The choice was done differently in each company. While Sogrape searches for 
specific characteristics, Cotesi is focused on acquiring the leader companies in 
core markets. 
 
Sogrape. It does not look for leading companies, but rather for specific 
characteristics of the target companies, such as brands’ profile, region where it is 
located, dimension and growth potential. 
According to the data retrieved, the most evident acquisitions’ cases of this 
concern with the characteristics of the target company was the acquisitions in 
Argentina and Spain. 
In Argentina, the target was located in a hot region (new-world wines), giving 




Sogrape had always an eye in Spain, since it is one of the main European wine 
producers. In this way, Sogrape was interested in the location, specifically in the 
region of Rioja and the brands’ portfolio Bodegas LAN could offer, broadening 
Sogrape’s product range. 
Cotesi. On the other side, Cotesi pursued a different strategy to choose the 
strategic partners. “The idea was to buy leading companies in every market”, said Eng. 
Rui Marques. Leading companies in their markets, capable of providing valuable 
know-how and technological innovation.   
 
The choice of the strategic includes the due diligence process, where the Sogrape 
and Cotesi had to evaluate the potential targets, before choosing them. 
4 . 4 . 1 . 2 .  D u e  D i l i g e n c e  P r o c e s s  
The due diligence process is different for both companies, mainly because of their 
choice of the strategic partner. 
 
Sogrape. It is necessary to make the distinction between the acquisitions of 
production and distribution companies.  
As presented above, Sogrape had long-lasting relationships with its importer in 
the USA and distributor in the UK. In these cases, the due diligence was not a so-
long process, since they had a courtship period, meaning that the parties knew 
and understand each other, having already a trustful relationship.  
On the contrary, the production subsidiaries were subject of a more detailed and 
long due diligence process, since Sogrape did not have any previous contact. 
Cotesi. Cotesi bought its major clients in Europe, meaning that it had a long 
period of courtship with each and every acquisition in distribution. So, the 
acquisitions did not go through a deep process of due diligence, since they had a 
long-term relationship, based on trust and many years of experience. 
In terms of production subsidiaries, the process was also not long; in the USA, 
the target company was Cotesi’s competitor; and the Brazilian target company 
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was Cotesi’s “historical supplier”. Therefore, in both cases, Cotesi knew each other, 
making shorter the due diligence process. 
From this section, it is possible to understand, the longer the previous 
relationship, the shorter the pre-acquisition due diligence process. 
4 . 4 . 2 .  P o s t - a c q u i s i t i o n  P h a s e  
4 . 4 . 2 . 1 .  I n t e g r a t i o n  
Based on the integration strategies study by Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991), this 
section scrutinises the strategies followed by the two companies. 
 
Sogrape. In its acquisitions, Sogrape adopted integration by symbiosis, where it 
can create and combine know-how in a worldwide basis, creating synergies and 
showing high strategic interdependence between all the subsidiaries. Moreover, 
the subsidiaries have high need for organisational autonomy, since “there is great 
independence between the business units. (…) They have independent management 
teams, which means that the decision-making in Argentina on what is done in Argentina 
is with management order in Argentina. So, there is a level of independence and a 
responsibility assigned to the company and its management team”.  
However, there is permanent control of Sogrape of its subsidiaries, with a special 
concern with its human capital, spread by 11 countries and 5 continents, under 
the motto, “People are our grapes”. In this way, it was important for Sogrape to 
collaborate with its subsidiaries, where they keep their independence, top 
management and personnel (insiders), but share know-how, capabilities and 
resources, creating synergies and defining the company’s success. 
Cotesi. In its acquisitions, Cotesi adopted integration by symbiosis, where it can 
create and combine know-how in a worldwide basis, showing high strategic 
interdependence between all the subsidiaries. Moreover, the subsidiaries have 
high need for organisational autonomy, since “they are all independent companies”.  
However, “there is a supervision of Cotesi, with platform. We are integrated into the 
SAP system. We have visibility into stocks, how they operate and then we communicate. 
But we try not to eliminate, not be a Portuguese in the USA or in England”. In this 
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way, it was important for Cotesi to collaborate with its subsidiaries, where they 
keep their independence, top management and personnel (insiders), but share 
know-how, technology and resources, creating synergies and defining the 
company’s success.  
 
Giving extreme importance to communication throughout the whole process, the 
integration phase was done naturally, where the parent companies did not 
impose their way to operate, employees and values, just maintaining the control 
over the subsidiaries operations. Each subsidiary run independently and by 
insiders (expect some exceptions, due to problems with previous employees).  
Sogrape and Cotesi agree that each market has different needs and culture and, 
as Hélder Silva commented, “you cannot impose things that can be very wrong in 
different countries”. 
Perhaps, this was one of the main reasons for the success of the cross-border 
acquisitions and their integration in the parent companies. 
 
Contrary to the high-rate statistics of failed acquisitions, Sogrape and Cotesi’s 
cross-border acquisitions can be considered a success, in terms of the choice, due 
diligence process and integration of the acquired companies.  
4 . 4 . 2 . 2 .  S y n e r g i e s  
Synergies were the main goal for both companies when they began the cycle of 
cross-border acquisitions.  
 
Sogrape. For instance, the distributors are crucial in the company’s value chain, 
since they make the connection between the producer and the 
customers/consumers. They have a relevant role in the feedback about the 
market and consumers. Moreover, buying production farmhouses, besides 
increasing immediately the clients’ portfolio and enter new market segments, it 
will broad the product range, making Sogrape an interesting choice for 
customers that wanted a specific brand that now is on the menu.  
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Cotesi. The most important achievement was the clients’ portfolio that grew from 
10 to 10 000, leveraging the exposure of the company. Moreover, Cotesi is a 
company that make great investments in technological development and the 
productive plants were important high-tech acquisitions, improving the 
company’s efficiency and effectiveness in the manufacturing of its products.  
 
As seen before, adopting an integration by symbiosis, Sogrape and Cotesi could 
combine know-how in a worldwide basis, showing high strategic 
interdependence between all the subsidiaries and creating valuable synergies. 
4.5.  LEADERSHIP AND VISION  
Sogrape. Fernando van Zeller Guedes was the responsible for the foundation of 
Sogrape Vinhos and the birth of Mateus Rosé. In the middle of WWII, in the face 
of the world economic and political instability, Sogrape was born envisioning 
internationalisation and the conquest of the global markets. It was due to the 
vision, character and personality of Fernando van Zeller Guedes, who took a 
chance and travelled the world, that Sogrape became a successful and leading 
wine company, when many claimed that was a failure from the outset. 
Cotesi. Founded by Manuel Violas, known as “a great industrialist and reference 
figure in the national and international panorama”, Cotesi stood out in the national 
and international arena from its early days. The domestic market never meant 
much, being the main goal the exportation to the global market. 
 
Fernando van Zeller Guedes and Manuel Violas’s vision and personality led 
Sogrape and Cotesi to take their first steps on the international arena. Their desire 
to internationalise was crucial for both companies, that were once small, seeking 
risky and complex markets with a lack of international knowledge.  
4.6.  COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE  
Sogrape. Sogrape conquered the international markets with its most famous 
wine, Mateus Rosé. Mateus emerged as an innovative product, with a genius 
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marketing and WWI military flasks appearance, starting to be exported to the 
international market. 
Cotesi. Always with a strong focus on innovation, Cotesi was a pioneer in Europe 
in the production of synthetic yarns, with the bet in the production of synthetic 
nets, as well as of bags and fabrics, being “left with the complete package, which we 
still offer our customers today", says Pedro Violas. 
 
Their competitive advantage for their differentiated and high-quality products 
has different sources. While Sogrape have been always betting on the product 
innovation, making different type of wines, Cotesi have been always investing in 
technological development, improving the process of production for its products. 
Therefore, to overcome their liability of newness, these companies had to develop 
R&D capabilities and technological knowledge to achieve competitive advantage 
over their foreign competitors, creating superior and differentiated products, 
with more efficiency and effectiveness in their production processes (Knight & 
Cavusgil, 2004).  
4.7.  STRATEGY  
Sogrape and Cotesi are companies with an innovative genesis and the desire to 
internationalise, making their high-quality products recognised worldwide. 
Their founders had a very clear vision about the international path of the 
companies, beginning the internationalisation process since their early days and 
being exporter entities, in which the domestic market was not the goal.  
At the beginning of their internationalization processes, the goal was to reach 
and conquer the core foreign markets. However, with the increasing openness of 
markets and new players arising in emergent markets brought changes to the 
world and business landscape, which led Sogrape and Cotesi to adopt different 






4 . 7 . 1 .  M o t i v e s  f o r  I n t e r n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  
As Sogrape and Cotesi are for-profit organisations, the acquisitions were for 
economic motives to increase its profits; however, the main motive was strategic 
(Brouthers et al., 1998; Johnson et al., 2011; Gomes et al., 2011). In a RbV perspective, 
the cross-border acquisitions were highly appealing for their potential to create 
and exploit valuable synergies, through the transference of unique capabilities 
and resources. 
 
Sogrape. To face competition of new-world wines, Sogrape managers adopted a 
strategy of diversification of products and intensification of internationalisation 
by widening the geographic area of wine production and its productive capacity, 
seeking to reduce the exclusive dependence on Portuguese production.  
With the acquisitions in Argentina, New Zealand and Chile, Sogrape acquired 
know-how on the new-world wines production. The expansion of its productive 
activities to Spain was the gateway into one of the Europe’s leading wine-
producing countries, strengthening Sogrape’s international position and 
achieving its business sustainability strategy. 
Moreover, the acquisitions of Evaton, Stevens Garnier and, more recently, 
Liberty Wines, was to control the distribution channels on the more relevant 
consuming countries, “promoting Portugal’s best wines throughout the entire world”.  
So, more than pursuing market power, Sogrape was mainly interested in 
developing and stretching capabilities and know-how, access to core markets, 
their consumers and distribution networks, strengthening their position at a 
global scale. 
Cotesi. With emergent countries undermining the business with its low-cost 
products, Cotesi had to change its strategy. It started a cycle of acquisitions of its 
major clients, leaders in their markets. 
It assured the control of its distribution networks, as presented before, and 
focused on the American market. 
Thus, it acquired Polyexcel in the USA, accessing to its highly-advanced 
technology and expanding its activities to the north-american market. To 
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consolidate and assure its leading position in this market, Cotesi made 
acquisitions in Brazil, USA and Canada.  
Acquiring the market leaders in the industrial sector of agricultural products and 
twines, Cotesi was not only interested in improving its financial performance, 
but mostly to increase its market share, develop and stretch capabilities and 
know-how and access to new and advanced technology, reaching the so-wanted 
position of market leader. 
 
To keep up with the innovative status, their motivations were market seeking, 
since both companies controlled their distribution networks to access and 
maintain a strong position in new markets; efficiency seeking, with the 
acquisitions of the production subsidiaries, increasing parent companies’ 
productive capacity; and, finally, strategic asset seeking, looking to obtain 
valuable skills, know-how and technology to maintain their competitiveness and 
leading positions in the global market. 
4 . 7 . 2 .  I m p o r t e r  v s .  D i s t r i b u t o r  
The USA market works under a system called the Three Tier System, that creates 
a very complex and competitive marketplace. 
Foreign brands cannot legally sell their wines or spirits to distributors or retailers. 
There is an intermediary figure, the importer, that will exclusively own the rights 
of the foreign brands in its territory. It has distribution partners that will supply 
the foreign brands to the market. 
This is the reason why Sogrape acquired an importer, Evaton, in the USA. Even 
if it had a stake on a distributor, it would need to exist an intermediary, that 
would not be part of the group and Sogrape would lose control. 
Therefore, cross-border acquisitions can target importers, rather than 





4 . 7 . 3 .  L o c a t i o n - s p e c i f i c  P r o d u c t  R a n g e  
At least in two acquisitions of Sogrape, location-specific product range was the 
requirement for internationalisation. 
As presented above, synergies together with the complementarity of product 
portfolio were two goals for cross-border acquisitions to make Sogrape’s brands 
complete and strong, when compared to competition. 
The acquisitions in Argentina, New Zealand and Chile allowed Sogrape to 
diversify its brand portfolio with premium wines recognised worldwide. 
Expanding its productive activities to Spain, one of the main European wine 
producers, Sogrape benefited from Bodegas LAN’s renowned brand portfolio.  
In this way, cross-border acquisitions and firm internationalisation were 
mediated by the product range of the target company. Moreover, from the case, 
it is possible to affirm that the more producer cross-border acquisitions, the more 
product range for internationalisation. 
4 . 7 . 4 .  R i s k  E x p o s u r e  
In the beginning, Cotesi’s had 10 clients, that represented 80% of company’s 
turnover. This means that if any of these clients were missing, either because it 
quitted the partnership with Cotesi or because it went bankrupt, it would 
immediately be translated into a commercial and financial penalty. 
With the cross-border acquisitions of the European distribution companies, 
today, instead of 10, Cotesi has 10 000 clients, in which none represents more than 
10% of the company’s turnover, incurring in a lower commercial and financial 
risk. 
Therefore, the more cross-border acquisitions of distributors, the less commercial 







This study intended to broaden the scope of research in the field of the cross-
border acquisitions, by understanding what is the effect of cross-border 
acquisitions in the firm’s internationalisation.  
It is our hope that this research will provide a relevant contribution to the study 
of a field that, while deserving the note-worthy attention of some academics, it is 
still claiming for a more thorough approach. 
This project was done through two case studies, where seven topics were 
identified as key factors to evaluate the effect cross-border acquisitions have in 
the firms’ internationalisation. It allowed to clarify in more detail for each 
company the triggers for cross-border acquisitions, their psychic distance, the 
role of business networks and how did the companies improved their position 
and control within them, analyse the process of acquisitions, the goal of 
synergies, the importance of leadership and vision, the competitive advantage 
and the followed strategy, in terms of motives to internationalise, the role of 
importer, the relevance of location-specific product range and the risk exposure. 
Firstly, it was possible to observe that one trigger was common to both case 
studies; new competition. For Sogrape, it was the emerging new-world wines 
and for Cotesi, it was the emerging countries. However, Cotesi shows another 
trigger in the USA acquisition. It bought Polyexcel due to a competitor’s 
bankruptcy. In this way, Sogrape and Cotesi began their cross-border 
acquisitions cycle when confronted with new competition and/or a competitor 
bankruptcy. 
When analysing the psychic distance of their first cross-border acquisition, it 
presents contradictory to the literature, in which companies expand to 
psychologically proximate countries. In this study, it is possible to observe that 




The business networks play an important role for the internationalisation of both 
companies, especially in terms of the distribution networks. Sogrape had “long-
lasting relationships” with its importer in the USA and distributor in the UK, its 
core markets. Cotesi, acquiring its major clients, had long and trustful 
relationships with its targets. It bought all its distribution partners in Europe. 
Both companies, to improve its position in their networks, took control over their 
distribution channels, being possible to conclude that the more 
importer/distributor cross-border acquisitions, the more distribution control for 
internationalisation. 
Sogrape and Cotesi’s acquisitions can be considered a success. To understand 
why, it is necessary to analyse their acquisition’s process. 
In terms of the choice of the strategic partner, while Sogrape searches for specific 
characteristics, Cotesi is focused on acquiring the leader companies in core 
markets. This study shows that this has consequences in the due diligence and 
negotiation processes.  
The acquisitions, in which the parent companies had long-lasting relationships, 
the due diligence and negotiation processes were shorter, because “the purchase 
itself was a consequence of something that lasted a long time”, as Eng. Rui Marques 
argues.  So, the longer the previous relationship, the shorter the pre-acquisition 
due diligence and negotiation processes. 
Regarding the strategy for internationalisation, there are four main conclusions. 
With Sogrape’s acquisition of Evaton, in the USA, it was found that cross-border 
acquisitions can target importers, rather than distributors, to increase firm’s 
internationalisation. 
Moreover, in Sogrape’s case study, some cross-border acquisitions and firm 
internationalisation were mediated by the product range of the target company. 
The cross-border acquisitions in Argentina, New Zealand and Chile gave access 
to a renewed portfolio of new-world wines and the possibility to compete in 
those markets. Bodegas LAN, more than allowing the entry in one of the main 
European producers, it allowed Sogrape to benefit from its renowned wines’ 
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portfolio. From these evidences, it is possible to affirm that the more producer 
cross-border acquisitions, the more product range for internationalisation. 
The final interesting observation was regarding Cotesi. Before acquiring the 
European distributors, Cotesi only had 10 clients, constantly incurring the risk of 
those clients jeopardise the business, in commercial and financial terms. To 
safeguard its business, Cotesi changed its strategy, beginning a cycle of cross-
border acquisitions of its distribution clients. Increased exponentially the number 
of clients from 10 to 10 000 and reduced its exposure to risk. Therefore, the more 
cross-border acquisitions of distributors, the less commercial and financial risk. 
Although the percentage of failed acquisitions is between 50 and 75%, Sogrape 
and Cotesi are two companies that followed a strategy of growth through cross-
border acquisitions, the result of which had been and still is a success. 
Making use of their highly-internationalised networks and their knowledge, they 
were capable to recognise and explore opportunities of growth. Through a cycle 
of cross-border acquisitions within and due to their networks, they improved and 
strengthened their positions in the global markets. 
Therefore, the cross-border acquisitions had a positive effect in the 
internationalisation of both companies. Perhaps, if they did not have invested 
and took the chance in the international arena, acquiring the biggest players, they 
could not have place in the top leading Portuguese multinationals.  
5.1. LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study was confronted with a few limitations. The main limitation concerns 
the shortage of literature and practical examples on the cross-border acquisitions 
within a company’s business network and how could it improve the company’s 
position and control. However, the chosen case studies prove to be extremely 
relevant to this topic and it was possible to collect significant information. 
The literature is rich on cross-border acquisitions’ process, giving as much 
importance to the pre- as to the post-acquisition phase. In this point, the study 
was not so concrete, since companies do not have inclination to share less 
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flattering information about, for instance, the integration phase and possible 
cultural clashes that may had arisen. 
This is a multiple case study research, providing different perspectives on the 
cross-border border acquisitions and firm internationalisation. One limitation of 
this qualitative method is perhaps the difficulty in generalising to other cases. 
Another limitation was the reduced number of samples collected. In this study, 
it was made one interview in each company, providing relevant data. However, 
there may be some more information that could be collected if there were more 
interviews, observation and time.  
From a practical standpoint, the present study will be able to help companies 
interested in cross-border acquisitions by alerting them to the possible obstacles 
they might face, as well as the effect it possibly will have in their 
internationalisation. 
The development of this academic research proposes a deepening of the 
knowledge associated to cross-border acquisitions and a few suggestions emerge 
that might prove useful for future researches. 
It would be enriching to identify further factors of cross-border acquisitions 
capable of influencing the firm’s internationalisation. An interesting further 
research would be to replicate this study to other countries or other industry 
sectors. In this way, it would be possible to compare them and the founded 
factors to discover if these cases can be generalised. Finally, what would be the 
changes in the cross-border acquisitions’ process, taking into consideration the 
Brexit. 
This study was conducted with the belief that raised some relevant questions, 
concerning a topic that, predictably, will merit the growing interest of companies 
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1. Identification and Characterisation of the Company 
 
1.1. : Social designation: 
1.2. Address: 
1.3. Postcode:   Town:  
1.4. Social Capital: National – %; Foreigner – % 
1.5. Start year of business activity:  
1.6. Business sector: 
1.7. Current number of employees:  
1.8. Name of the person completing this questionnaire:  
1.9. Role in the company:  
1.10. E-mail:  
 
2. Internationalisation Process 
 
2.1. Start year of exports:  
2.2. % of exports in the sales volume:  
2.3. Number of foreign markets:   
2.4. Core markets: 
2.5. % of total international clients:  % 
 
3. What is the international activity of the company? 
 
 Exports 
 Foreign Direct Investment. How?  
 Both (Exports and FDI) 







4. What factors contribute to the selection of markets in internationalization? 
 
 Language 
 Historical and Cultural bonds 
 Economic growth indexes  
 Proximity 
 Emergent markets 
 Developed markets 
 Presence of major and core competitors  
 
5. United Kingdom  
 
5.1. Start year of exports United Kingdom:  
5.2. Year of the first foreign investment (acquisition) in the United Kingdom: 
5.3. Number of UK subsidiaries:  
5.4. Name and location of subsidiaries:  
5.5. Activity of the same (production, distribution, etc.): 
5.6. What were the motive(s) for the acquisition(s)? 
  Personal (personal ambition, increased salaries through increased 
sales) 
Specify. 
  Strategic (extending markets, improving and obtaining new 
capabilities for the company and workers, increasing market power, acquiring a 
competitor, accessing new technologies. 
  Specify.  
  Economic (diversification of risk, economies of scale, cost reduction) 
Specify. 
5.7. How did you get the opportunity to buy the British company(ies)? 
 
